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DULCEY B. FOWLER

Virginia Family Law: Tlle Effect of The
General Assemblv's
1975 Revisions
"'

T

HE legislation concerning domestic relations enacted in the 1975 session of the Virgin ia General
Assemhly further liberalized grounds for dissolution
of marriage, reorganized and redefined more logically
many grounds for dissolution, and eliminated those
vestiges of sexual discrimination remaining after the
1974 amendments. The big news is that the period of
separation necessary for a no-fault divorce has been
cut from two years to one year, and that women as
well as men may now be required to pay not "alimony" but "support and maintenance to the spouse."
The courts are to determine the level of any such support and maintenance for a spouse or children by
taking into consideration six specifically enacted new
factors actually derived from the prior case law on
alimony and support.
Other developments are that former grounds for
divorce which were based on conditions existing prior
to marriage are now made impedimenl5 to marriage
for which annulment rather than divorce may be
decreed; that the legislation reflects a stricter attitude
towards underage marriages by making them void
rather than voidable; and that the Code will now for
the fir~t lime explicitly ban marriages between individuab of the same sex.
Medical And Fonnal Requirements
Regarding medical and formal requirements for
marria~e, the new legislation makes few changes.
Section :20-4 now requires the physician to submit a
written report to the state whenever evid ence of syphi lis
is found at the time of pre-marital serological testing.
Section 20-27 is an example of the com prehensive
changes throughout this new legislation in rendering
section, sexually neutral in their application. It now
permits the party celebratin g a marriage to charge
the partil:s, rather than the husband a lone, a fcc which
can now be as much as $20 rather than the fanner

Dukey Brown Fowler earned her J.D. (with
honors) from George Wa~hington University
Law School in 1965. She held the Law School
Trustees Fellowship and served as Associate
Editor of the Law Review. After returning to
this country from Canada where she worked
for CCR, Canadian, Mrs. Fowler was admitted
to the Virginia State Bar in 1970 and practiced
law in Charlottesville from 1970 to 1972. She
earned her LL.M. from the University of Virginia in 1973 and worked as a Staff Attorney
with the Appellate Justice Project attached to
the Virginia Supreme Court from 1973-74.
Mrs. Fowler is currently Assistant Professor of
Law at Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College
of William and Mary and teaches, among other
courses, juvenile and family law.

7

$10. Meanwhile, Section 20-29 providing for a permissive certification to the Commonwealth of a Virf,rinia resident's out-of-state marriage has been repealed.

Unlawful Marriages
The legislature has made major and beneficial
changes to Chapter 3 covering unlawful marriages.
The revision eliminates the confusion between grounds
for annulment and grounds for divorce which has long
been characteristic: of legislation in Virginia and
many other states.
(a) Incest.

First, Section 20-38 covering incestuous marriages
has been repealed, and the long list of relatives among
whom marriage was prohibited has now been replaced by Section 20-38.1 (b) and (c) which apparently bar marriages only on the basis of blood
relationship. The old legislation barred some marriages based on relationships created by affinity, but
the new statute follows almost entirely the suggested
wording of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act by
declaring "prohibited" only marriages based on blood
relationship, except for the special case of adoption.
Accordingly, marriages are prohibited only between
"an ance.~tor and descendant, or between a brother
and sister, whether the relationship is by the half or the
whole blood or by adoption"; and "an unde and a
niece or between an aunt and a nephew, whether the
relationship is by the half or the whole blood." Both
the decisions to omit from the prohibition the blood
relationship between cousins and any relationship
ba~ed on marriage may be due to doubts as to the
justification for such prohibitions and perhaps in the
latter case a desire to eliminate reflections of earlier
sectarian influences on such legislation. 1

(b) Bigamy.
New subsection 20-38.1 (a) (1) also declares "prohibited" a marriage entered into "prior to the dissolution of an earlier marriage of one of the parties."
While the term "prohibited" adopted from the Uniform Act might create some confusion as to whether
bigamous and incestuous marriages are void absolutely
or voidable only upon judicial decree, any question is
removed hy the retention of old Section 20-43 which
makes bigamous marriages absolutely void and by new
Section 20-45.1 ( a) which states that all marriage.~
1
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prohibited by 20-38.1, are void as well. These p~
visions indicate a stricter attitude on incestuous marriages, since formerly, under Section 20-45, incestuous
marriages were merely voidable rather than void.
However, new Section 20-38.1 (b) makes legitimate
the children of void marriage.~ involving bigamy and
incest.
(c) Nonage and Incapacity.
Section 20-45, which formerly made voidable
those marriages involving incest, insanity, or incapacity
from physical causes, has been repealed, and Section
20-45.1 ha'i been substituted. It adds to the list of
void marriages all marriages where one or both
parties are under 18 and consent has not been obtained as provided by Section 20-48. Sections 20-48
and 20-49 have been revised to set the minimum age
for both sexe.<> for marriage at 16, with consent being
required if either of the parties is under 18. 2 Consent
may be given by either parent; a judge if there is no
parent or the child has been adjudicated delinquent,
dependent, or neglected; or the State Department of
Corrections if the child has been committed to it, but
not the Welfare Board a~ previously provided. The
judge of the circuit court for the county or city where
either party lives may consent, rather than just the
judge of the court where the female resided, as
formerly.
The previous age limits were 18 for boys ami 16
for girls. However, while lowering the age limit" the
state has now moved away from the majority rule
elsewhere and taken a stricter attitude toward.'; enforcement of age limits by making marriage.s between
the age.~ of 16 and 18 void where there is no COIl~cnt.
Previous Virginia law had made underage marriages
neither void nor voidable except by the underage
party. 3 However, new section 20-45.1 (b ) retaim the
essential rule as to mental incapacity of old 20-45,
which referred to "insanity," in providing that where
one party is incapacitated because of "mental illfirrTlit)'," the marriage is voidable only.
(d ) Homosexual M arnage.

The new Section 20-45.2 declare.<; "prohihited"
marriages between individuals of the same sex, and,
hy analoR)' to the treatment of bigamous and in2 However, if either party is under 16, the marriagr "ill
be valid if pregnancy is certified and appropriatf' ' ('men!
obtained.

3Va. Code Ann. §20-89 ( 1950 ) ; N u dam v. Nerdam. I fl3
Va. 681, G8G ( 1943).

cestuous marriages, it seems clear that any such marriage would be absolutely void. Apparently, the inclusion of this Section was believed advisable because
of the 1971 case of Baker v. Nelson! in which the
Supreme Court of Minnesota found that the absence
of a statutory ban on same-sex marriages did not
indicate that they were statutorily authorized.
Desertion And Nonsupport
Chapter 5 of the Code covering desertion and nonsupport has been revised with the primary purpose
of rendering all provi.~ions sexually neutral in their
operation. Thus, the obligations as well as the benefits
of ~upport and maintenance of either the other spouse
or childrcn are extended to both sexes. For instance,
Section 20-61 formerly made the husband responsible
for th(~ ~llpport and maintenance of his wife if she
were in neressitous circumstances but the wife corresponding-Iy liable only if the husband were incapacitated due to age or other infirmity. The Section
now makes the partie.'> equally liable in such circumstann',. rn addition to rendering several other sections
sexu:dly neutral, the word "alimony" has been deleted ent irely and "support and maintenance for the
spou,c" ~lIbstituted.
Srrtion ~0-88 concerning support of parents by
children has also !Jeen revised. The age at which such
dllt\ ariq'~ has heen raised from 17 to 18, and the
obli~;ltion, and benefits have heen extended so that
female..; a' well as males are liable. Moreover, the
fathcr need not be "aged or infirm" in order to be
enlitkrl to such support. The section has also been
chall.~cd ~o that the juvcnile and domestic relations
di>trict ('ourts are g-iven exclusive jurisdiction of parent
slIppllrt ('a<;es pursuant to the 1973 reorganization of
the ~tate court system, and the child is now to he rcli('\"("(l of the duty of support of parents if the parent is
"ollj("rwi~e eligible for and is receiving public as,i,rall( c or services under a federal or State program."
Thi.; Ltng-uag-e replaces a previous awkward proviso
tklt the child's financial resources should not be considered in determining- his parent's eligibility for
a"i-;Lulce.
. \ , tl) the Revised nifornl Reriprocal Enforcement
of Sllpport Act, only Section 20-88.22: 3 which pro"iek, fur immunity of an obligor from criminal prose(iltillli for refusal to answer a question during pro('("('din~' ~ \lndcr the Act has heen changed, and it has
hCI'1I Illade sexually neutral.
4/1,11...,\'. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971 ) .

Divorce, Affirmation And Annulment
(a) Annulment.
A~ indicated earlier, Chapter 6 covering divorce,
affirmation and annulment has been extensively revised. Section 20-89, which provided generally that
both void and voidable marriages might be decreed
null hut that an underage marriage could not be
annulled except at the behest of the party underage
at the time of marriage, has been repealed. It has
been replaced by Section 20-89.1 which includes subsections (a) through (d). The Section must be read
carefully to discover that subsections (a), (c), and
( d) end with periods and arc therefore independent
of one another. However, subsection (h ) ends with
only a semicolon which indicates that it must be read
together with subsection (c ) in order that the latter
be interpreted correctly.

Subsection (a) provides generally that when a marriage is alleged to be void or voidable for any of the
statutorily specified causes or by virtue of fraud or
duress, either party may institute a suit for annulment. The subsection thus parallels fairly closely the
repealed section except that reference~ to new sections
are incorporated and fraud and dure<;s explicitly introduced into the Code for the first time as marital
impediments.
However, subsections (b) and (c) together accomplish the incorporation into this annulment section of fonner grounds for divorce which covered conditions prior to marriage and were therefore more
properly cognizahle in annulment suits. Thus, grounds
for divorce formerly listed as subsections 20-91 (2),
( 4), (7), and (8 ) dealing with impotence, prior conviction, pregnancy of wife by another man, and previous prostitution of the wife, have not only been
transferred to the annulment section but rendered
sexually neutral in the proce<;s. Accordingly, annulment can now he decreed where the husband, without
knowledge of the wife, has fathered a child born to
another woman within ten months after the date of
the marriage or where either party has been, without
the other'~ knowledge, a prostitute.
In keeping with the prior treatment of these impediments as grounds for divorce, subsection (d)
provides that there shall he no annulment on the basis
of any of these four impediments if the party seeking
annulment has cohabited with the other after knowledge of the relevant facts or in any ca~e where the
annulment is not sought within a two year period
after the marriage. This subsection ha~ obviated the
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need for old Section 20-92 covering the same subject
when these impediments were treated as divorce
grounds, and it has been repealed.
Subsection (d) of 20-89.1 raises a question of
interpretation. In line with the old section 20-89, it
provides that an annulment on the grounds of nonage
cannot be granted to the party who was of the proper
age at the time of the marriage. This provision was
logical under the old legislation where the marriage
was treated a~ valid until and unless the party underage at the time had it nullified by court decree. However, new Section 20-45.1 makes such marriages void
as noted earlier. If the term is intended to be used in
the usual sense of absolute invalidity, then the party
marrying an underage person is prohibited from obtaining a judicial declaration that his supposed marriage never in fact existed at all. Since this party
could validly marry another person it would seem to
be in his and the public's interest to allow judicial
clarification of his supposed marriage as in the case
of all other void marriages as provided by subsection
20-89. 1 (a) .
(b) Divorce and Support and Maintenance.

Section 20-91 which enumerates grounds for absolute divorce has been clarified by the deletion of the
former grounds now made impediments to marriage
and incorporated into Section 20-89. 1. Other than
those deletions, there are four rather important
changes. The first ground which includes adultery,
sodomy, and buggery now has been modified to include only sodomy and huggery committed outside
the marriage. Thi.~ change is in line with the general
philosophy that sexual conduct between spomes should
not be a matter for state concern.
Subsection (3) concerning penitentiary confinement
subsequent to marriage has also been clarified so that
it now requires conviction of a felony, more than
one year's sentence, and subsequent confinement without cohabitation after knowledge of such confinement.
rn suhsection (6), cruelty and reasonable apprehension of hodily hurt are for the first time introduced
into this Section covering grounds for absolute divorce. Previously, they were named only as grounds
for a divorce a mensa hut were judicially treated as
"constructive desertion" alter the lapse of the statutorily prescribed onc year waiting period. Such constructive desertion was thus held a ground for absolute
divorce under this subsection which formerly covered
explicitly only desertion or abandonment.
The new wording of subsection (6) provides that
an ahsolute divorce may be decreed "after a period
10

of one year from the date of such act [of either
desertion or cruelty]." Obviously, it was intended to
legislatively overrule the fornler case law that held
that desertion must be continuous for the required
statutory period and that the offending party had a
right to return during the waiting period whieh reo
turn would bar a divorce.~ Such legislative intent is
consistent with the judicial interpretation of the last
ground for divorce listed in subsection 20-91 (9 ), i.e.
separation for one year or no-fault divorce. The ju.
dicial interpretation of legislative intent as to the
separation ground has been that fault is not to be
considered a factor and that a divorce should be
granted after the statutorily prescribed period even
if the original separation was not mutually voluntary
but in fact amounted to desertion. s Both the cruelty
and desertion ground and the separation or no-fault
ground now require only one year's living apart. ThU5)
consistency requires the overturning of the old case
law on desertion, since a spouse who alleges desertion
as grounds should not be required to take the offendcr
back during the statutory period if there is no such
requirement in the case of separation.
Most important, subsection 9 covering the separa·
tion or no-fault ground has been revised so that the
statutory period has been cut from two years to one
year, as stated previously. Also, the three paragrapru
of the subsection have been newly labeled (a), (b),
and (c), and new paragraph (c) formerly providing
that reliance on this ground for divorce could not in
any way lessen any obligation of support to a wifc
has been made sexually neutral as to the possibility of
such support.
Several less important changes have been made in
succeeding sections. Section 20-94 covering the effect
of cohabitation after knowledge of adultery has been
extended to apply to sodomy and huggery as well and
to bar action by the party alleging such act rather
than "the plaintiff" a<; fonnedy, provided procurement
or connivance can be shown. Section 20-95 covering
divorces a mensa now specifies "wilful" desertion in
line with similar changes in Section 20-9 1. Section
20-99 now extends the requirement of corroboration
of the parties' testimony to suits for annulment and
affirmation as well as for divorce. Section 20-101
requiring that the divorce decree show the race of the
parties has heen repealed, and changes to 20-102
make it no longer necessary to prove an offer of recon·
5Wrightv. Wright. 125 Va. 526 ( 1919 ).
I)

Canavos v. Canavos, 205 Va. 744 (1965).

ciliation in a divorce suit for "wilful" desertion.
Furthermore, Section 20-103 granting the court authority to order support payments pending suit has
been made sexually neutral, and Section 20- 104 regarding orders of publication against nonresident
defendants has been extended to make such service
availahle in su its for affirmance of marriage.
However, major revision has occurred regarding
Section 20-107. Generally, this section providing that
the court may decree regardin g the estate and maintenance of the partie~, custody of children, and resumption of a former name ha.~ been rendered sexually neutral. The word "alimony" ha5 again been
replaced by "support and maintenance of the spouse"
throughout. Moreover, new language appended to the
section lists six specific fa ctors for courts to consider
in detcrmining support and maintenance either for the
other spouse or children . These are as follows:

( 1) the earning capacity, ohligations and
needs, and financial resources of the parties;
(2) the education and training of the parties
and the ability and opportunity of the parties
to secu re such education and training;

(3) the standard of living established during marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;

(5) the age, physical and mental condition
of the parties;
(6) such other factors as are necessary to
consider the equities hetween the parties.

Provided, however, that no permanent support and maintenance for the spouse shall be
awarded by the court from a spouse if there
exists in his or her favor a ground for divorce
under any provision of §§ 20-91 ( 1) through
(8) or 20-95 [fault grounds for either divorce
a mensa or a vinculo J.
This language is in accord with the prior state case

law regarding the award of alimony and support and
appears to bc sufficiently comprehensive.
Several other sections have been revised to reAect
the new support and maintenance terminology as
applied to the spouse, including Sections 20-109 regarding changes in support and 20-110 covering cessation of such payments upon remarriage. Section
20-1 12, regarding notice when proceedings are to be
reopened, has been made applicable to support for
a spouse as well as children, and now explicitly state~
that reopening may be for the purpose of increasing,
decreasing, or terminating any such payments.
Other sections which have been rendered sexually
neutral and have suhstituted the teml maintenance
and support for the spouse in place of alimony include: §§ 20-113 (respondent fails to perform order
for support and maintenance); 20-114 (reco1-,'l1izance
may be refJuired for compliance with order) ; 20-11.1)
(commitment and sentence for failure to comply );
and 20-122 (advertising offer to ohtain divorce). In
addition, Sections 20-121, (merger of divorce a mensa
with divorce a vinculo ) and 20-121 (decree a vinculo
without divorce a mensa) have been revised to reAect
the new explicit requirement of "wilful" desertion.
Significantly, Section 20-119 has been repealed.
It formerly permitled courts to restrain a party guilty
of adultery from remarrying whcre adultery was the
ground of the divorce. This change gocs along with
the general liberalization of grounds for divorce occurring in recent years in the successive shortening of
the statutory periods for divorce and the nation-wide
trend away from 'fault ideas I'egarding marital breakdown.7
In general, the Virginia General Assemhly should
be congratulated for having accomplished this year a
comprehensive and progressive revision of the domestic relations law of the state.
70ne·third of the statcs ha ve adopted no·fault gro unds
for divorce based on "llTctrievable breakdovm" or "mecon ·
cilable differences" between 1970 and 1974.
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